# Predicting HR/FB rates for hitters using weighted pitch values

(If you care only about results and not about the process, scroll down to the section aptly titled HERE YA GO.)

Victor Martinez indirectly and semi-strangely inspired this post. I was browsing FanGraphs’ weighted pitch values for hitters — something I hadn’t done before, as I’ve really only used the metric for pitchers — for 2014 and my thought process went something like that:

Jose Abreu feasted on fastballs; V-Mart feasted on sliders… Wow, V-Mart actually fared better against sliders and curveballs than fastballs and cutters. I wonder if that has any correlation with his plate discipline.

In short: no. A hitter’s success versus pitches according to weighted pitch values (per 100 of that pitch) determines about 40 percent of his walk rate and barely 4 percent of his strikeout rate. (I’m ballparking it on the K% figure.)

But I got to thinking a little more: these weighted pitch values have to be good for something other than scouting hitters (which, moving forward, maybe we starting throwing Abreu some more offspeed stuff? I don’t know).

Alas, I took a crack at it: I tested the correlation between weighted pitch values and home runs per fly ball (HR/FB) rates. And I was very pleasantly surprised.

Let’s start with context. Each player, very obviously, records his own HR/FB rate each year. Players with more power will record higher HR/FB rates, and players with less power will record lower rates. Therefore, each player, in a sense, creates his own benchmark (which, arguably, is his career HR/FB rate: he hits this many home runs as a percentage of fly balls on average). However, we know that HR/FB fluctuates annually: a player with a 15% career-HR/FB does not hit exactly 15 of every 100 fly balls over outfield walls every season like clockwork. Still, there is an expectation that he will hit a certain number of them out — hence, the benchmark.

Using regression analysis, the idea of the benchmark can be captured by seeing how, say, 2014’s HR/FB rates correlate with 2013’s rate, as well as 2012’s, 2011’s and so on. I downloaded all available ball-in-play data for seasons by “qualified” hitter as separate seasons dating back to 2002, thereby representing an exhaustive list. The line of best fit looks as follows, where L1 represents the year prior, L2 two years prior, L3 three years prior:

x(HR/FB) = .018 + .321*L1.(HR/FB) + .252*L2.(HR/FB) + .228*L3.(HR/FB)
Between R-squared: .74

One might astutely observe that a player who hit exactly zero home runs the three previous years can still be expected to hit about 1.8 percent of his fly balls over the wall, and one might call to arms to force the intercept term to zero. It seems absurd, nay, impossible that a player who never hits home runs could be expected to suddenly hit one, but let us not forget we witnessed the impossible happen just last year. That’s what makes baseball a beautiful sport: anything can happen.

Anyway, the equation above is actually really helpful in predicting expected HR/FB; its R-squared indicates the line explains almost three-quarters of the model’s fit. It also bestows the greatest significance to the most recent year as measured by its coefficient, with declining significance associated as years become further removed, which makes sense. But… BUT.

It’s not helpful in predicting HR/FB for hitters who have only been in the league fewer than three years. Moreover, it seems especially difficult to predict future HR/FB rates for hitters with only one year of data, such as the monstrous Abreu. (Maybe Abreu did inspire this post after all.) Observe:

x(HR/FB) = .032 + .694*L1(HR/FB)

After a little bit of algebra, we can intuit that the equilibrium HR/FB rate is roughly 10.4 percent. I use the term “equilibrium” because it appears that no matter what HR/FB a hitter posted in his first career season, his next-year HR/FB will be expected to converge (aka regress) toward the magical number of 10.4 percent. Again, observe:

.032 + .694*(12%) = 11.5%
.032 + .694*(8%) = 8.7%

You can perform this exercise with any value, and the results will be the same: a 2014 HR/FB rate lower than ~10.4 percent will be expected to increase in 2015, and a rate higher than ~10.4 percent will be expected to decrease in 2015. Now this, this, is actually absurd. Granted, the equation is communicating what would happen on average, but hitters are not homogeneous.

This is all a very long-winded way of saying two things:

1) When the sample is incredibly small — namely, one observation — using history as a guide fails us.
2) I think I may have found an alternative that relies not on a single year’s worth of HR/FB data but on a single year’s worth of weighted pitch value data.

## HERE YA GO

Let me be clear, up front: I know there will be a lot of multicollinearity inherent in this analysis — that is, HR/FB and weighted pitch values are dependent on each other in some fashion. I don’t know how weighted pitch values are calculated exactly — it would behoove me to look it up, but I am lazy, a current self-descriptor of which I am not proud — but, intuitively, a hitter who hits home runs more frequently off of particular pitch types will likely record higher weighted values for those pitches. Essentially, the weighted values are calculated using home run frequency, and I am now trying to reverse-engineer it.

But I don’t see that as a bad thing. There is a profound correlative capability in the data, and using that information to glean whether or not a hitter was, perhaps, a bit lucky when it came to his HR/FB frequency is, I hope, less preposterous than pulling a number out of your rear-end.

## HERE YA GO, FOR REALSIES

I will use strictly weighted pitch values per 100 pitches (denoted wXX/C, where XX represents the pitch abbreviation). I omit knuckleballs because not all players saw them, and I omit splitfingers because they are statistically insignificant, probably because they aren’t thrown very often, rendering the weighted pitch values more volatile. I also add K% and BABIP presuming the following: strikeout rates are positively correlated with HR/FB rates, and BABIP, which positively correlates with hard-hit balls such as line drives, is likely to also positively correlate with similarly-hard-hit balls such as home runs. (A regression that includes only weighted pitch values and excludes K% and BABIP produces an adjusted R-squared of .45.) The line of best fit equation is as follows:

x(HR/FB) = .2049 + .0352*(wFB/C) + .0081*(wSL/C) + .0014*(wCT/C) + .0041*(wCB/C) + .0063*(wCH/C) + .5244*K% — .6706*BABIP

Again, the model produces a great line of best fit per its R-squared — almost identical to its lagged-variable counterpart. As it should; if there’s multicollinearity, it should. (And there is.) But reverse-engineering the process should create accurate predictions of what should have been a hitter’s HR/FB rate in a given season because of the multicollinearity; in this instance, it’s not a bad thing.

Some trends emerge instantly, trends similar to those I saw in the xK% and xBB% studies I performed earlier: regardless of a player’s power potential, he will over-perform or under-perform his expected HR/FB rate, and he will do so with consistency. For example, Adam LaRoche, despite his apparent power stroke, consistently under-performs his xHR/FB:

HR/FB: actual minus expected
2010: -1.89%
2012: -1.87%
2013: -1.77%
2014: -0.75%

Meanwhile, Albert Pujols consistently out-performs his xHR/FB:

2010: +2.02%
2011: +5.67%
2012: +1.80%
2014: +2.13%

Each data set has its noise, but you can see based on these limited samples where each hitter experienced a bit of luck: LaRoche, in 2014, saw a minor spike, and Pujols saw a major spike in 2011.

Rather than going through each player individually, I will highlight a few extreme, fantasy-relevant outliers from 2014 and reflect accordingly. Without further adieu (and in alphabetical order by first name):

This is the largest negative differential in the 2014 data. Without another full season of data to compare, this huge difference is likely a sign of bad luck, although there is a chance that he is a severe under-performer in the same vein as Matt Carpenter (who has under-performed his xHR/FB by about 7 percent the past two years). I already liked the guy for his speed and control of the strike zone, and the prospect of a pending power spike is enticing.

Coco Crisp, -5.78%
Crisp is a great case study: he notched a career-high 12.4-percent HR/FB in 2013, then promptly slid back down to single digits in 2014. His 2014 xHR/FB, however, indicates his HR/FB should have been closer to 11.5 percent, almost 6 percent higher than his actual mark and only 1.2 percent less than 2013. Meanwhile, his 2012 and 2013 expected and actual HR/FB rates are almost identical. His power-speed combination was pretty valuable two years ago — when he wasn’t on the disabled list, at least.

Curtis Granderson, -5.92%
Granderson bottomed out in woeful aplomb last year, but his xHR/FB offers a glimmer of hope. I’ll be honest, though, I can’t remember the last time this guy was fantasy relevant. But if you’re looking for sneaky power at the expense of everything ever, he could be your guy.

Giancarlo Stanton, +5.33%
The Artist Formerly Known as Mike posted positive differentials in 2011 and 2013, but each was one-half and one-third the magnitude of last year’s differential. His 2013 and 2014 xHR/FBs are practically identical — 20.16% and 20.17% — so it looks like Stanton chose a good year to get a little bit lucky.

Jason Heyward, -5.56%
Speaking of bottoming out, Heyward’s power all but evaporated last year. Fear not, however, as his 2014 xHR/FB is only 4 percentage points less than 2013’s — which still sucks, but at least it’s not as bad as a whopping 10 percentage points. It’s probably too obvious to count on a comeback, but no matter.

Jason Kipnis, -4.39%
His year-by-year differentials: -0.01%, -2.61%, -4.39%. His year-by-year xHR/FB: 9.71%, 15.01%, 9.19%. I don’t know what to believe, really, because it’s hard to tell what’s real here and what’s not. But, again, here ye beholdeth another bounceback candidate.

Jonathan Lucroy, -3.77%
His 2014 xHR/FB was a percentage point better than 2013’s. The dude is too good.

Jose Abreu, +8.52%
Now this man, THIS MAN, is the real reason why we’re all here. What can we make of that? We know that prodigious power hitters such as Pujols and Stanton can exceed expectations. But this expectation is set pretty high. I think we’re all expecting regression, but it’s everyone’s best guess as to how much. I’m thinking a drop from 27-ish percent closer to a Chris Davis-esque 22 percent.

Lucas Duda, -3.38%
I don’t have any other reliable full-season data for Duda to compare, but at least it wasn’t a positive differential. The negative implies that last year’s breakout was probably legit — and maybe there’s still room for improvement.

Similarly to Duda, Adams’ only full season came last year. But the mammoth power we saw in 2013 didn’t disappear as much as it did suffer some bad luck. His 2014 xHR/FB of 12.19 percent still isn’t where any of us would like it to be, but again, maybe there’s still room for improvement.

Matt Holliday, -3.09%
Holliday, who perennially out-performs his xHR/FB, appears to have gotten pretty unlucky last year. Of the last five years (dating back to 2010), 2014’s xHR/FB was right in the middle. I know he’s getting old, but man, he’s a monster, and I think there’s juice still in the tank.

Nick Castellanos, -5.20%
Might be a little more pop in that bat than we know.

Nori Aoki, -6.08%
His power simply vanished, but the xHR/FB is in line with past years. He could return to his 10-HR, 25-SB ways in short order.

Robinson Cano, +2.33%
This is my absolutely favorite result in the entire 2014 data set. Cano always out-performs his xHR/FB; that part does not concern me. It’s the xHR/FB itself: it dropped off almost 7 percent from 2013 to 2014. Seven percent! Say what you will about Safeco Field sapping power, but methinks a larger share of that 7 percent is a 32-year-old man in decline.

Xander Bogaerts, -3.88%
See Castellanos, Nick.

Yasiel Puig, -4.58%
Remember how Puig hit way fewer home runs last year and all that stuff? Hey, I traded him midseason (he will cost only \$13 next year, but I won my league so it all works out) for Carlos Gomez and a closer. In the moment, I think I made the right move: Puig’s home run rate never really improved. But his 2013 differential was +5.24%. Cutting the crap, his 2013 and 2014 xHR/FB rates were 16.56% and 15.68%, respectively — smack-dab in the middle of both years. Thus, taking the average of the two may not be such a bad method for projection after all.

OK, that’s everything. The players listed above were merely a sample and are by no means exhaustive when it comes to the peculiar splits I saw. More importantly, the implications are most interesting where they are hardest to draw: players such as Abreu and Eaton very clearly seem to have benefited (and suffered) at the hands of luck, and we can surely expect regression. But… how much? ‘Tis the question of the day, my friends.

Edit (1/8/15, 11:42 am): FanGraphs’ Mike Podhorzer, who coincidentally posted a xHR/FB metric for pitchers today, developed a similar metric for hitters a while back, to the tune of a .65 adjusted R-squared. I feel pretty good about my work now.

# 2014 Rankings: Outfielders

Rankings based on 10-team standard 5×5 rotisserie format.

Name – R / RBI / HR / SB / BA

1. Mike Trout – 119 / 91 / 31 / 39 / .320
2. Ryan Braun – 98 / 103 / 30 / 28 / .308
3. Andrew McCutchen – 102 / 90 / 23 / 27 / .298
4. Adam Jones – 97 / 91 / 32 / 15 / .283
5. Jose Bautista – 101 / 96 / 37 / 6 / .276
6. Carlos Gonzalez – 92 / 86 / 24 / 20 / .299
7. Matt Holliday – 95 / 97 / 24 / 5 / .300
8. Carlos Gomez – 95 / 69 / 24 / 39 / .268
9. Alex Rios – 91 / 82 / 21 / 28 / .284
10. Hunter Pence – 88 / 99 / 23 / 14 / .275
11. Jay Bruce – 86 / 101 / 33 / 8 / .253
12. Jacoby Ellsbury – 84 / 56 / 13 / 45 / .286
13. Justin Upton – 95 / 77 / 24 / 15 / .270
14. Josh Hamilton – 79 / 92 / 28 / 8 / .272
15. Austin Jackson – 105 / 53 / 16 / 13 / .292
16. Alex Gordon – 90 / 76 / 19 / 12 /.281
17. Shane Victorino – 91 / 62 / 16 / 26 / .278
18. Yoenis Cespedes – 78 / 87 / 26 / 12 / .265
19. Michael Cuddyer – 86 / 84 / 21 / 10 / .271
20. Giancarlo Stanton – 75 / 85 / 31 / 5 / .259
21. Bryce Harper – 88 / 60 / 21 / 15 / .273
22. Yasiel Puig – 91 / 73 / 19 / 16 / .256
23. Carlos Beltran – 75 / 80 / 22 / 3 / .286
24. Torii Hunter – 79 / 83 / 17 / 6 / .283
25. Curtis Granderson – 81 / 63 / 32 / 15 / .250
26. Jayson Werth – 68 / 62 / 23 / 13 / .298
27. Starling Marte – 89 / 51 / 14 / 43 / .249
28. Adam Eaton – 98 / 45 / 10 / 29 / .274
29. Norichika Aoki – 87 / 47 / 11 / 25 / .289
30. Matt Kemp – 70 / 68 / 20 / 13 / .294
31. Jason Heyward – 82 / 65 / 25 / 11 / .263
32. Melky Cabrera – 77 / 66 / 14 / 11 / .297
33. Michael Bourn – 94 / 52 / 7 / 31 / .269
34. Alfonso Soriano – 72 / 99 / 27 / 7 / .241
35. Carl Crawford – 81 / 62 / 12 / 20 / .284
36. Shin-Soo Choo – 77 / 66 / 17 / 19 / .272
37. Nelson Cruz – 66 / 81 / 25 / 10 / .267
38. Coco Crisp – 84 / 59 / 11 / 29 / .264
39. Wil Myers – 82 / 86 / 17 / 8 / .258
40. Nick Markakis – 83 / 75 / 13 / 1 / .281
41. Khris Davis – 74 / 74 / 23 / 8 / .254
42. Desmond Jennings – 87 / 51 / 14 / 26 / .255
43. Rajai Davis – 68 / 44 / 8 / 47 / .267
44. Billy Hamilton – 77 / 39 / 2 / 68 / .241
45. Brett Gardner – 92 / 48 / 7 / 27 / .263
46. Justin Ruggiano – 63 / 63 / 22 / 18 / .253
47. Angel Pagan – 70 / 51 / 8 / 22 / .285
48. Domonic Brown – 68 / 79 / 19 / 6 / .251
49. Michael Brantley – 66 / 59 / 8 / 17 / .285
50. B.J. Upton – 72 / 60 / 15 / 27 / .224
51. Christian Yelich – 80 / 53 / 11 / 21 / .246
52. Josh Reddick – 71 / 66 / 19 / 8 / .240
53. Will Venable – 61 / 51 / 12 / 24 / .265
54. Josh Willingham – 67 / 77 / 21 / 3 / .237
55. Andre Ethier – 60 / 64 / 15 / 3 / .281
56. Dayan Viciedo – 61 / 68 / 21 / 0 / .264
57. Colby Rasmus – 75 / 63 / 19 / 4 / .244
58. Corey Hart – 64 / 61 / 16 / 3 / .272
59. Kole Calhoun – 61 / 65 / 16 / 5 / .269
60. Gerardo Parra – 66 / 51 / 10 / 10 / .281

Thoughts, lots of ’em:

• Full disclosure: I have NO IDEA what to do for Billy Hamilton. I did a brief bit of research to see how a player’s stolen base trend changed throughout the minorsand  into the majors, and for the most part, a player still attempts to steal at about the same frequency in the majors as he did in Triple-A. As for Hamilton’s on-base percentage, that’s the million-dollar question. He’s a game-changer, but I don’t know if he’s worth taking in the first five or six rounds, as I’ve clearly shown above.
• Ryan Braun, folks. He’s being drafted 17th on average in ESPN mock drafts right now, but I don’t see how he won’t be a top-10 or possibly top-5 fantasy player by year’s end. On their Fantasy Focus podcast, Eric Karabell and Tristan Cockcroft argued about how many bases Braun will steal. My projection is lofty; Karabell is pretty negative about it, thinking closer to 15 swipes. Still, give him a mere 10 stolen bases and he’s still the game’s second-best outfielder. He’s a rich man’s Andrew McCutchen formerly on PEDs. So… not quite McCutchen, but you know.
• Speaking of PEDs, it’s weird to see Melky Cabrera’s name on that list, yeah? A look at his peripherals last year shows he may have suffered some bad luck beyond any PED regression (if such a thing exists), including a horrid AB/RBI rate that’s all but out of Melky’s hands. I’ll give it another season before writing him off completely; we tend to have too short of memories when it comes to players in fantasy. He was solid for two years, and I’ll take a two-year trend over one. Considering he’s being drafted 52nd overall, I guess this officially makes him a sleeper.
• CarGo is ranked uncharacteristically low, but my projection took the under on his games player. I maintain if he can play a full year, he’s actually a smidge better than Braun. If you’re cool with risk and can build a roster around the possibility that CarGo will be sidelined at any given moment, he’s worth the massive upside of staying healthy just once. Please, CarGo. For us.
• Speaking of guys with built-in injury risks: Ellsbury, Stanton, Harper, Granderson, Werth. If you want to construct a risky, huge-upside team, make these guys your five outfielders. Don’t forget the Grandy Man hit more than 40 home runs in 2012 and 2013, and Stanton can hit 40 home runs with his eyes closed. He’s, what, 24 years old? That’s insane.
• Touching on Harper again, I know he’s pretty low here. If he can play a full 162 or a close to it, he’s a 30/20 guy who will crack the top 10. I think the MVP talk can be put to rest before the season starts, though.
• Wait, guys — WHAT? Jose Bautista? Yeah, dude. He’s a monster and, like Granderson, he still has huge power. It never left, and he was on pace for big things last year before it got derailed. Take a leap of faith. One of these guys has to stay healthy this year, right?
• Puig will naturally be a topic of discussion all year. I paid careful attention to Puig’s projection; let me be very clear that I think this is his absolute floor. This is looking at huge regression in BAbip (batting average on balls in play) and HR/FB (home runs per fly ball). Honestly, he’s probably better than a .300-BAbip batter, and if the power and speed is real, this is a huge undervalue. I’m well aware that every other projection has him snugly in the top 30 or so players, so this is likely falling on deaf ears.
• I wrote about Cruz’s immense power potential that is perpetually muted by his inability to stay on the field. You know what’s super interesting? He’ll likely be used in some weird rotation with Nolan Reimold and Henry Urrutia all at left field and the designated hitter, with him seeing the lion’s share of at-bats at DH — all but removing his injury risk. Give him another 150 at-bats and he’ll gladly reward you with eight to 10 bombs. Now, to remove that PED risk, too.
• Khris “Krush” Davis is interesting because it’s hard to tell if his power is super-for-real or just regular for-real. Like Puig, I think this is more of a floor projection — and that’s saying a lot. The strikeouts might be a problem, but if you’re drafting him for his batting average, you’re not doing it right.
• Yelich at No. 51 was really interesting to me. He’s a sneaky speed guy with something like a 15-homer, 25-steal upside and a solid batting average, making him a must-draft outfielder. If only there were Marlins on base for him to knock in…
• Honorable mentions for cheap power Raul Ibanez and Mike Morse
Honorable mentions for cheap speed: Leonys Martin and Ben Revere. I actually like Martin a lot more than his lack of projection here indicates. He’s got pop, and a full season in the Texas Rangers’ outfield makes him 100-percent draftworthy.
• P.S. I don’t have much faith in Marlon Byrd. But take a chance on him if you want.

# Rumors: White Sox looking at Tanaka (updated Jan. 9)

Update is at the bottom of the post.

According to ESPN Insider, the New York Yankees and Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim aren’t alone in looking at the Japanese ace Masahiro Tanaka. It appears that the Philadelphia Phillies and Chicago White Sox have joined the mix.

In a matter of months, the White Sox went from boring and terrible to interesting. Now they are absolutely fascinating.

They have made the best moves this offseason, far and away, basically acquiring center fielder Adam Eaton for diddly squat, dealing closer Addison Reed before he got too expensive and signing Cuban first baseman Jose Abreu who, if he is even moderately productive, will prove to be an incredibly valuable commodity.

Now the Sox have squared up their crosshair on Tanaka, another international superstar who will likely be undervalued, even despite all the hype. Because of incomplete information about foreign professionals, teams simply can’t tell if a pitcher will be a stud or a dud, no matter his pedigree. This risk factor causes teams to discount a player — I can guarantee you Yu Darvish will greatly exceed the value of his contract over its duration — and I think all dealings with Tanaka will be no different.

Maybe I’m the only one, but I think the White Sox are now the frontrunner to sign Tanaka. They have clearly demonstrated they are rebuilding, and so far they are doing it in all the right ways. They were not afraid to spend to get Abreu, one of the biggest bats to ever come out of Cuba.

And now, here presents a similar situation, where a team with nothing to lose has a shot to come out on top in a bidding war that involves two (former) powerhouse teams trying to curb their payrolls. The Yankees and Angels are both threatening to surpass the luxury tax threshold this year, and signing Tanaka would almost certainly push either one over the edge by the season’s start. The White Sox, on the other hand, have plenty of wiggle room, and I imagine they would be willing to dish out another six-year deal like Abreu’s.

They’re building a team that will be relevant not now, but in three years. Add Tanaka to the mix, and they’ll be more than relevant — they’ll be contenders again. Maybe it’s a bold prediction. But I can’t tell you how excited I will be if it proves to be true.

Updated Jan. 9, 2014: The Chicago Cubs, Seattle Mariners, Los Angeles Dodgers and Arizona Diamondbacks all plan to look at Tanaka as well. The Mariners are making big moves, but their outfield needs more help than their pitching staff, and an investment in Nelson Cruz may be the better move. The Dodgers have shown they’re not afraid to spend, but they also already have one of the best rotations in the majors and may be less inclined to pay up. Of this group, that leaves the Diamondbacks, Phillies and Cubs. The D-backs have made some decent moves this offseason, but I think they’ll get overshadowed. As for the latter two, I think they are merely posturing, simply tossing their names into the mix. However, the Phillies did sign Miguel Alfredo Gonzalez, so perhaps they’re willing to further test the international talent pool.

# AL Central: White Sox win, Royals set up title shot

A couple of big trades went down recently, including an exciting three-way trade among the Chicago White Sox, Arizona Diamondbacks and Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim. Surprisingly, everyone benefited, even if the Angels traded back for someone they originally traded away to get Dan Haren (sigh…). The Detroit Tigers also made a move, effectively making two moves in the process.

White Sox trade SP Hector Santiago to the Angels
Diamondbacks trade OF Adam Eaton to the White Sox, SP Tyler Skaggs to the Angels
Angels trade OF/3B Mark Trumbo to the Diamondbacks
Yowza! I nearly spit out my drink when I got this text message from ESPN. I’ll touch upon the Angels first. Good for you, Glen Coco, for dealing Mark Trumbo before his value skyrocketed. In return, they got two young pitchers — and yes, one of them they originally drafted and then traded to get Haren — which is exactly what they needed: bullpen depth and young players. Now think about how lethal Arizona’s corner infielders are. The Diamondbacks gave up a lot for Trumbo, though. If it was a secret until now, let it be known that I am a huge Eaton fan, so I think it was premature of the Diamondbacks to deal him before they could reap the benefits (and then some, if they decided to trade him once his stock rose). Same goes with Skaggs. So, at its roots, the White Sox win this trade for giving up only Santiago to get Eaton. Santiago has potential but the walk rate is a large concern. It’s trending in the right direction, though, and in a couple of years, Santiago could be a serviceable starter. Until then…

Winner: White Sox
Santiago’s preseason rank: 116th
Skaggs’ preseason rank: 80th, with upside
Eaton’s preseason rank: Low-tier starter, with upside — full rankings pending
Trumbo’s preseason rank: 2nd tier 1B — full rankings pending

I like Aoki. A buddy, colleague, what-have-you of mine dubbed him Ichiro Lite. And that’s exactly what he is. He’s consistent, albeit underwhelming, but he’ll give you double-digit homers and steals (well, almost). It’s hard to tell if he’s more the 2012 Aoki (10 HR, 30 SB) or the 2013 Aoki (8 HR, 20 SB), but those are serviceable numbers nonetheless. He also pretty much halved his strikeout rate while improving his walk rate, so there’s a lot to like as far as adjusting to Major League pitching is concerned. I think his 2014 will be a happy medium between his last two years. Meanwhile, the Royals gave up Smith to the rebuilding Brewers for only one year of Aoki (a point I should have gotten around to about 100 words ago), and Smith looked as if he was just turning a corner. I can’t say I was a fan of Men in Black III, and I loathed Smith for his horrendous, although short, 2012 campaign, so I’ll be the first to admit I overlooked Smith’s outstanding 33-1/3 innings in 2013. If he can keep up that momentum, the Royals may regret it. With a rotation that has relied on Jeremy Guthrie and Bruce Chen for years, it will leave me wondering how Smith might have improved things. In this trade, the Royals are leaning toward contending rather than rebuilding — which should come as no surprise, given their relative success last year.

Winner: Brewers
Smith’s preseason rank: Unranked
Aoki’s preseason rank: Low-tier OF

DET signs RP Joe Nathan
One move means two moves: Nathan is the closer, and Bruce Rondon is in limbo. I won’t pretend to tease the idea of the Tigers using Nathan as their setup man. Rondon will be relegated to the setup role at best, and if he thrives, questions will be asked. However, it could prove to be a stroke of genius, as the game’s most crucial pitching moments don’t always come in the final inning. But people don’t really care about that. People care about saves. Sorry, Rondonites. It’s 2015 or bust — and by bust, I mean, maybe the Tigers will trade Rondon instead of let him rot! Well, now I’m intrigued. This is why I can’t leave me alone with me.

Winner: Nathan
Nathan’s preseason rank: Pending
Rondon’s preseason rank: Fantasy irrelevant

CHW re-signs 1B Paul Konerko
The team won’t be in contention anyway, so they’re pretty much just thanking the guy for his long, highly productive tenure as a White Sock. Nothing to see here, except for a team that’s flushing away a few million dollars.

Winner: Konerko
Konerko’s preseason rankFantasy irrelevant